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2. (a )  What psychological place does intensity occupy amongst the 
attributes of sensution ? 
In what relation does interasity stand to those modes of 
experience which bear a close psychological af ini ty  to 
semation and its attributes ? 
WJ&h.di$erences of sensation do we call intensive ? 
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7. 
What i s  meant by the term ' quantitative ' ? 
I s  intensity a multitude or a magnitude 1 
What other objects besides intensity are at least magnitudes ? 
Can intensity possibly be treated as a multitude ? 
The source of the confusion. 
THIS question inay be specialised into a series of questions. The 
answers given to them will not only indicate the special points at which 
differences of opinion may legitimately arise, but will also show that 
certain difierences are due to a confusion of ideas and may therefore be 
eliminated. 
1. Which differences of sensation do we call intensive? It is 
agreed, I think, by all that the classification of certain differences as 
intensive cannot possibly be called in question. The cutaneous, mus- 
cular, gustatory, olfactory, and auditory sensations all possess the 
undoubtedly similar attributes of intensity. We may, of course, enquire 
whether intensity is native to all these groups of sensations and, if not, 
how they came to acquire it. But that it is there, is surely not disputed. 
Nor does the absence of any marked degree of variation of intensity, as 
for example in the articular sensations, really present a difficulty. The 
only important problem in this connexion is whether the particular 
case of visual brightness is to be classified as a form of intensity or as a 
form of quality or the like. But we can afford to neglect this problem 
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here and to confine our attention to the accepted cases of intensity. If 
visual brightness is to be considered intensive, the conclusions which 
are obtained for accepted forms of intensity will apply to it. But it is 
of interest to notice in passing that the proper classification of the 
attributes of sensation is not a perfectly simple task. There is room for 
serious divergence of views even a t  the present time'. Introspection 
is, of course, the only ground upon which a true classification can be 
founded. But i t  must be granted that the first, or in fact, any single, 
deliverance of introspection about the inherent nature and connexions 
of experiences is not necessarily irreproachable. We have to learn to 
think truly about simple experiences, just as about the objects of the 
physical world we live in. 
2. (a) What psychological place does intensity occupy amongst 
the attributes of sensation ? I n  discussing whether intensity is quanti- 
tative or not, reference is frequently made to extensity, as if the latter 
were undoubtedly quantitative. A certain amount of prejudice against 
a negative judgment regarding intensity is thus created. If this pre- 
judice is misleading, it must be removed. I do not think that extensity 
can legitimately be considered to be a variable attribute, It is invariable. 
It is not really less present in the sensation from a spot' than in that 
from an area ; there is not more of it in a square inch than in a square 
centimetre of colour. Nor is a low tone properly more voluminous than 
a high one. What there is more of in these cases is extent or volume, 
not extensity or voluminosity. We have indeed said for long enough 
that low tones are more voluminous than high ones. We had perhaps 
good reason to fear a confusion between the volume of a tone and the 
volume of the physical material, if we had used the same term for both. 
But nowadays this confusion can hardly occur in reference to the study 
of sensation. It is no longer from without, but within the field of 
psychology that the danger appears. 
The variant commonly referred to under the name of extensity, 
voluminosity, and massiveness, then, is not an attribute of sensation. 
It is a derivative, a higher product, a Gestalt, like that of a line or a 
curve, and it is variable in the sense of being greater or less, like these. 
The attribute of extensity2 is the common basis of extensiveness, the 
real ground of fusion and continuity of sensation in the midst of 
differences of local sign and its analogues, position and pitch, which 
I prefer to group under the generic name of orders. If the same 
2 I hope to deal with this attribute more fully at another time. 3 Cf. op. cit. 
1 Cf. my discussion of pitch and other cases in this Journal, IV. 843 ff. 
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distinction is applied to the attribute of temporal extensity or duration, 
we obtain the following grouping of the attributes. Quality and 
intensity stand apart from the others, which fall into two pairs. Each 
pair comprises an extensive and an ordinal member and the two pairs 
may be named temporal and systemic. But, however tempting i t  may 
be for the purpose of systematic appearances, it is impossible to  treat 
either quality or intensity as extensive or as ordinal in character. They 
are both ordinal in the sense of being self-disposing, but this peciiliarity 
of them cannot be identified with ordinality; for upon differences in 
quality or in intensity none of those Gestalten or inodes of sensory 
experience are founded which grow upon ordinal contents, viz. distance 
or interval, motion and others ; and besides, quality and intensity are 
both more than merely self-disposing. 
( b )  In  what relation does intensity stand to those modes of 
experience which bear EL close psychological affinity to sensation and its 
attributes ? These modes of experience have been forcing themselves 
with ever increasing insistence upon the notice of psychologists. There 
can be no doubt about their enormous variety and importance. Since 
the leading paper by Chr. v. Ehrenfels in 1890, by whom they were 
called Gestaltqualitaten, a large number of studies have been made of 
them’. Such modes of experience are said to be founded upon contents, 
which may either be other modes or in many cases elementary 
sensations. I believe that there is always a certain amount of 
resemblance between the founded mode and its founding contents or 
some aspect or attribute of the latter, as well as an objective psychical 
dependence of the mode on its founding contents. These relations seem 
to me to form good ground upon which a body of pure psychological 
theory concerned with the interconnexions and development of experience 
may be built upa. Many modes are variable and self-disposing, as being 
greater or less than one another in respect of their own peculiar pheno- 
menal content. Distance and interval of time and motion are amongst 
the simplest of them, but there are many others3. The full and adequate 
study of these modes, their variety, relations, and theoretical explanation, 
is one of the newest forms of the psychological task, and will undoubtedly 
show itself to be one of its bulkiest parts. 
In  this connexion I see reason to  differ from certain views indicated 
1 The first volume of a most valuable and important work by Karl Biihler on Die 
a Cf. my paper on the ‘‘ Psychology of Visual Motion,” in this Journal, VI. 
Gestaltwahrnehmungen has just been published (1913). 
This Jownal, IV. 157 ff. For other modes of. Biihler, op. ci t .  
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by Dr Myers in I. 5 2. The modes which stand next to elementary 
sensation seem to be, first distance and time-interval, and then, as a 
combination of these two, motion. Spatiality, if it is merely simple 
distance, seems to me to be in the matter of psychological origin 
independent of motion; if it is complex, such as is the spatiality of 
binocular vision, it does not seem to me to involve motion as a necessary 
psychological antecedent at all. Nor do I see any evidence for the 
existence of a psychological a.ntecedent to intensity, simpler than 
intensity, from which intensity might arise by the integration of two or 
more of its varieties, as distance may be said to be integrated out of 
differences in the attribute of order. Any other speculations regarding 
the origin of intensity seem to me to be either inventions or to rest 
upon mistaken correlations. 
3. It seems to 
be agreed that there are two possible meanings. A quantitative object 
is either, 
(a )  A collective object, whether real or ideal-a number of material 
particles, persons, states of mind, events, or a number of ideal numbers, 
lengths, forces, universals. Let us call this kind of object a multitude. 
A self-disposing object, or an object say a,, which in virtue 
of its own phenomenality disposes itself amongst other objects of the 
same group ah, a,, a d ,  etc., in a definite manner, so that i t  falls between 
a,, and at, and not between ad and af ,  and which in these relations 
appears to be greater than a, and less than at.  This kind of object 
is known aa a magnitude. 
Is intensity a multitude or a magnitude 1 [With regard to the 
expression ' intensity differences ' in the title of this discussion, I take 
it to mean, in the first place, intensities, and only in the second place, 
if a t  all, differences of intensities, such as those between la and Ib, Ib 
and l c . ]  On two poiuts there seems to be agreement: (a )  intensity 
is a t  least a magnitude; and ( 6 )  we cannot yet validly treat it as a 
multitude. We can, therefore, proceed to discuss the possibilities that 
are logically unafiected by these decisions. But before doing so it is 
well to turn aside for a moment and ask another question. 
What other objects besides intensity are a t  least magnitudes ? 
I t  is agreed, I think, that felt distance and motion and other such 
modes of experience or Gestulten are also at least magnitudes. We may, 
therefore, infer that the world of experience is rich in objects of this kind. 
Probably all forms of experience are, in some sense or to some degree, 
self-disposing objects. But a nutnber of them cannot be considered to 
What is to be meant by the term ' quantitative ' 1 
Or (b )  
4. 
5. 
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be magnitudes, for example the above mentioned attributes of temporal 
and systemic order, percepts, recognition, concepts, thoughts and the 
like. The most obvious groups of experiential magnitudes are the 
modes and figures (Gestalten) of space and time, their combination in 
motions, and the various classes included under the term ‘ relations.’ 
Magnitudes seem to occur by preference on what is obviously a duple 
or multiple foundation, such as we find in distance, succession, and 
change, or on what for various reasons may legitimately be held to be a 
duple or multiple foundation, as in minimal distances, motions, changes, 
etc. Feeling is one of the few cases in which a duple foundation seems 
to elude our grasp, but even here there is some sort of positive evidence’. 
But there is a t  least no reason to doubt that differences of intensities 
are magnitudes and that we find it comparatively easy to arrange them 
and to observe and to  indicate their apparent equality. In  so far as we 
consistently maintain their phenomenal equality, we have as much 
rewon to believe in the validity of our introspective judgments, as we 
have to believe in them in other regions of introspective work. But if 
a, b, and c are not multitudes, but experiential magnitudes, we cannot 
suppose that judgments regarding the equality of the differences 
between a and b and between b and c justify the statement that the 
difference between a and c is twice that between either of the former 
pairs. For the judgment regarding a and c has no bearing on the 
other two judgments, and vice versa. All just noticeable difl’erences 
are equal in being just noticeable, but that does not make them equal 
increments. Nor can equal differences be considered to be equal parts 
of another difference, i.e. equal increments within the latter difference. 
Is there any sense in calling the tone interval g-f twice as great as 
that between g and c’, because the intervals g-c‘ and c’- f’ are equal 
in being fourths? Besides, a distance is not the difference between 
two points, but these and the stretch between them in a unity. 
It would carry me too far from the object of this discussion, were 
I to enquire whether any non-mental, for example, material or ideal 
objects, are at least or solely magnitudes. Nor do I think it would 
throw any light upon the object of discussion, 
The con- 
clusion I wish to plead for in this discussion is that it cannot, so long 
as the identity of the object under discussion, namely intensity, is 
maintained. I would suggest that an object cannot at one and the 
. 
6. Can intensity possibly be treated as a multitude? 
1 Cf. my discussion of it in this Journal, IV. 184 ff. 
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same time be directly immeasurable and indirectly measurable, as 
Meinong’ declares and as Professor Dawes Hicksz agrees. Such a 
proposition can have an appearance of plausibility only by the sub- 
stitution of a new measurable object for the one that is directly 
immeasurable. This substitntion may be occasioned by the close 
connexion of the two objects in the world of reality, but it is none the 
less a substitution. To speak of a surrogative form of measurement is 
both misleading and wrong. What the medical thermometer measures 
is not the patient’s sensations of warmth or cold or how warm or cold 
he feels. I n  this particular instance the departure from any sort of 
regular correlation between magnitude of felt warmth and degree of 
temperature is notorious. What the physician is usually concerned to 
know is the temperature of his patient’s body. And that is as little a 
surrogative measurement of his patient’s feelings as the sight or taste 
of the physic he offers is a surrogative cure for his patient’s felt discom- 
fort, however much or little the material physic may be suited to restore 
the patient’s body to its normal condition. No one sets out to  measure 
the sensed distances evoked by a thermometer scale, but only the lines or 
lengths of that scale. The latter are measurable, as are any multiple 
objects, in so far as they produce regular changes upon lines or lengths. 
I n  all cases i t  is only that aspect of the motion of matter which by an 
obvious convenience has come to be called temperature that is measur- 
able. 
I would also submit that in every case in which the treatment of 
single states of mind as multitudes is in any way made to be plausible, 
we find a substitution of objects of the kind mentioned. So for example 
in Fechner’s formula, which is perfectly valid in so far as S in the 
expression S = h7 Log I means ‘ the numerical value of S,’ if i t  exists. 
But unfortunately this value has no real object; the object and the 
value are purely imaginary. The fault here does not lie in the applica- 
tion of mathematical symbols and processes to the data of sense; for 
these are most certainly applicable to the data of sense whenever we 
have an opportunity of dealing with multitudes of these data, e.g. in the 
statistical manipulation of records of the frequency of visual and other 
images, in the study of memory and so on. The error committed by 
Fechner consists in applying mathematical symbols and processes to the 
data of sense without any proper psychological or objective justification. 
And similarly in other such examples. 
1 Ztschr.f. Psychol., 1896, XI. 239. 
2 Cf. pp..168 ff. 
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There is no theoretical difficulty in discovering truths that are non- 
truths. The truths ‘wanted’ 
are simply not there to be had. 
The substitution of objects I speak of may also be illustrated from 
Dr Myers’s main thesis that the physiological correlate of intensity 
differences is a sub-group of extensive changes. That may very well 
be, but the thesis, as it stands, cannot be considered to  afford any inter- 
pretation or elucidation of intensity or its differences. If it is a valid 
hypothesis, it certainly establishes a fact, it discovers a reality, a new 
kind of extensive distribution of physiological processes ; and i t  sets 
this reality into relation with intensity. We are not 
thereby brought any nearer to a treatment of intensity as a multitude. 
We merely know now a relation in which intensity stands that we did 
not know before. It does not affect the case in the least that the object 
with which intensity has been shown t o  stand in relation is itself a 
multitude. Physiology can be said to throw light upon psychological 
matters only in so far as a sufficient number of these relations between 
experiences and physiological processes are discovered to warrant the 
inductive assumption that certain known physiological units stand in 
certain relations to known psychical units or that certain as yet unknown 
psychical units exist and are related to these known physiological units 
in certttin ways. I do not by any means deny the possibility of this 
inductive procedure. But I very much doubt whether the reverse does 
not constitute the method of greater illuminative power. 
I n  short, no single state of mind can be treated as a multitude, not 
even the idea of 100 itself. Only the object of the idea of 100 can be 
so treated. But I do not mean hereby t o  imply that every object can 
be treated as a multitude. We must, of course, discover and determine 
If we succeed, the 
object is a multitude: if we do not succeed, it may often still be a 
multitude. We cannot tell apriori where we are to look for objects 
that are multitudes and where not. Otherwise psychologists have made 
a sorry waste of their time and energy. It is quite possible that some- 
one may yet prove by new methods that behind intensity there lie 
psychical objects now unknown to us which are to be considered as 
multitudes and are responsible for the phenomenon of intensity (cf. 
Myers, I. 9 2). But not even such a proof would enable us to look upon 
intensities as themselves- multitudes. Such a magnitude as intensity, 
like the so much discussed and practically useful distance, must remain 
a magnitude for ever and ever. 
The difficulty is always a ‘practical’ one. 
Rut that is all. 
’ whether any given object can be so treated or not. 
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This may be enforced by another illustration. It is possible to 
maintain that felt distance is realiter psychologically founded upon 
repeated ( i e .  a multitude of) sensational elements qualified by extensity 
and order and that thus differences of multitudes are the real basis of 
the differences of magnitude found in distances. But not even that 
would make distance in any sense a multitude. Only its real psycho- 
logical basis would be a multitude’. 
If we had such as this imaginary knowledge of the real psychical 
basis of intensity, we might formulate the laws of mind and predict the 
psychical future better than we do now. But future mental states can 
be predicted by the knowledge of the physical world we already possess. 
We can, for example, arrange the illumination of a room so as to produce 
various mental effects. Yet that fact does not imply that we can 
measure intensity or its differences. Nor would the discovery I 
imagined. 
If, finally, it be suggested that intensity can be treated as a multi- 
tude or measured by convention, I would submit that such ‘measurement’ 
is only a means of naming what stands in a real relation to something 
else that can properly be measured, as star brilliancies to the varying 
intensity of physical light. 
7. The source of the confusion in these matters is an epistemological 
one-either a confusion of objects or a confusion of the immediate basis 
of knowledge in sensory experience with the objects of knowledge. I n  
the latter case distance as sensed, for example, may be confused with 
length, felt motion or its velocity with motion through real space or the 
velocity of real motion. But it is surely absurd to suppose that any 
sort of reality-called velocity-exists that is a unitary magnitude in 
the sense in which colours and tones and felt velocity are such, and that 
nevertheless is measurable in numbers. Such a unitary reality is a 
myth, the hypostatization of a complex set of correlated relations in 
which a real or ideal object stands. Whether these relations are 
themselves real or ideal, actual or imaginary, makes, of course, no 
difference to  the case. 
If I rejoice in the possession of a new book, neither the possession 
nor the book thereby become feelings or emotions. If I know yonder 
tree is budding, neither the tree nor the budding thereby become either 
sensations, perceptions, or knowledge. They are only the objects of my 
knowledge and as such come into relation to my knowledge. So if I can 
1 Cf. the analogous theory given by E. R. Jaensch of the psychical representation of 
empty space, Zt8Ch. f. Psychol., Erg.-bd. YI. 244 ff. 
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measure lengths, why should I worry about not measuring distances as 
felt (Gestalten), when I have already ascertained that I cannot measure 
them 1 If lengths are in fact measurable, the equality or differences of 
distances may be the sensory basis on which the cognitive processes of 
conception and knowledge involved in the act of measurement build. 
But that is no reason why I should require or expect to be able to 
measure distances. If unitary distances are not to be converted into 
multitudes, we must just enquire how our cognitive processes can 
nevertheless make measurement of lengths possible. It is futile to 
think distances ought somehow to be measurable or to construe them 
so as to imagine them measurable. A real object has certain definite 
properties and it stands in certain definite relations to other objects; all 
one can do is to find out these things by knowing. Knowing powers 
will never by themselves alone change the properties of objects or set 
them into new relations, unless these be relations to my knowing or 
unless I somehow act upon the objects so as to change their real 
relations. 
It seems necessary to make these remarks as there is a consensus of 
opinion that we actually do not succeed in measuring mental magnitudes 
such as intensity; and yet attempts are made to give the impression 
that after all our intellect is not so ineffective and useless as i t  is (most 
perversely) considered to be and that we really do measure these magni- 
tudes; only we do not do the measuring in these cases directly or 
straightforwardly but indirectly or by substitution, or to put it bluntly 
by make-believe. 
